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Re´sume´ Non Technique
Les cycles e´conomiques pre´sentent en ge´ne´ral une asyme´trie marque´e : les expansions
sont caracte´rise´es par des hausses durables mais mode´re´es de l’emploi et du PIB, tandis
que les re´cessions sont plus brutales et accentue´es. Cette asyme´trie, documente´e par
une large litte´rature empirique pour les Etats-Unis, ainsi que pour d’autres e´conomies
avance´es, semble s’accentuer depuis la fin des anne´es 80. Certains auteurs ont e´galement
de´montre´ que l’asyme´trie des fluctuations du PIB peut eˆtre renforce´e par une de´te´rioration
des conditions financie`res.
Ce papier contribue a` expliquer l’asyme´trie des cycles e´conomiques. Nous modifions
une version simplifie´e du mode`le canonique des cycles re´els (RBC, Real Business Cycle)
afin d’admettre la possibilite´ que certains interme´diaires financiers font de´faut en cas de
crise. Ce cadre nous permet d’e´tudier le lien entre les frictions financie`res dans l’e´conomie
et l’asyme´trie du cycle en e´quilibre ge´ne´ral. Nos re´sultats confirment que les facteurs
financiers sont une importante source d’asyme´trie. Nous discutons e´galement des liens
entre le degre´ d’asyme´trie et le bien-eˆtre d’un me´nage repre´sentatif.
D’un point de vue technique, notre mode´lisation du secteur financier adopte une struc-
ture dite a` ge´ne´rations imbrique´es : a` chaque pe´riode, une ge´ne´ration d’interme´diaires
financiers quitte le marche´ tandis qu’une nouvelle entre. Cette hypothe`se donne aux
interme´diaires quittant le marche´ la possibilite´ de faire de´faut sur leurs obligations, ce
qu’ils choisissent de faire lorsque les conditions e´conomiques se de´gradent. Le mode`le
inte`gre e´galement une friction financie`re, en imposant un couˆt d’audit aux nouveaux
interme´diaires qui entrent sur le marche´ en pe´riode de crise. A cause de cette friction, le
stress financier cause´ par un e´pisode de de´faut se propage a` l’e´conomie re´elle et ge´ne`re
un cycle e´conomique asyme´trique.
Certaines restrictions techniques nous permettent de calculer a` la main la solution
du mode`le, de manie`re a` obtenir une repre´sentation exacte de l’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral. Nous
obtenons trois re´sultats principaux.
Premie`rement, notre mode`le est capable de reproduire deux proprie´te´s importantes des
donne´es : l’asyme´trie ne´gative des variables agre´ge´es (telles que le PIB) et l’asyme´trie
positive des e´carts de taux d’inte´reˆt (credit spreads). Dans les deux cas, l’asyme´trie
trouve sa source dans l’amplification par les frictions financie`res des effets d’e´pisodes de
de´faut occasionnels. Ainsi, nous pouvons de´montrer que le degre´ d’asyme´trie du cycle
dans notre mode`le augmente avec la se´ve´rite´ des frictions financie`res.
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Deuxie`mement, nous de´montrons l’existence d’un lien entre asyme´trie et bien-eˆtre.
L’intuition sous-jacente est simple : une asyme´trie ne´gative du PIB implique des re´cessions
plus fre´quentes et plus se´ve`res, ce qui pe´nalise la consommation moyenne des me´nages
et donc leur bien-eˆtre.
Troisie`mement, nous montrons qu’une politique simple, base´e sur l’emploi d’une taxe
“pigouvienne”, permet de diminuer a` la fois la probabilite´ et la se´ve´rite´ des e´pisodes de
de´faut, au prix d’une distorsion des de´cisions d’investissement. Cet arbitrage signifie que
la politique optimale doit e´galiser le gain marginal re´sultant de la re´duction des e´pisodes
de de´faut avec la perte marginale lie´e a` la distorsion des de´cisions d’investissement.
Il s’ensuit notamment que la taxe optimale augmente avec la se´ve´rite´ des frictions
financie`res dans l’e´conomie, dans la mesure ou` celles-ci amplifient les couˆts lie´s aux
e´pisodes de de´faut.
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1. Introduction
Business cycles are asymmetric in the United States: expansions are characterized by
long-lasting but moderate increases in aggregate variables such as GDP and employment,
whereas recessions correspond to sudden but substantial drops in activity.1 This pattern,
which generates negative asymmetry (or negative skewness), has been documented by
a number of authors, including Neftci (1984), Hamilton (1989), and Morley and Piger
(2012). It also appears to be strengthening: recent work by Jensen, Petrella, Ravn, and
Santoro (2019) finds that the skewness of US business cycles has become increasingly
negative since the mid-1980s. These authors suggest that financial factors, in the form of
rising private-sector leverage associated with occasionally binding borrowing constraints,
can account for this surge in asymmetry. In addition, Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Gian-
none (2019) find that the lower tail in the distribution of GDP growth is associated with
periods of deteriorating financial conditions, confirming the role of financial forces in
driving macroeconomic skewness.
Building on this literature, our paper studies cyclical asymmetry in a Real Business
Cycle (RBC) model augmented with financial intermediaries that may default on their
liabilities, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). We use this setup to yield insights about
the relationship between the strength of financial frictions and asymmetry in general
equilibrium. In doing so, we substantiate the idea that financial forces have the poten-
tial to explain cyclical asymmetry. We also study the relationship between asymmetry
and welfare. In particular, the financial friction generating cyclical asymmetry in our
model also causes welfare losses, and we study the effectiveness of a simple regulation in
overcoming these properties.
More precisely, our framework builds on a RBC model with standard households
and firms and a single technology shock, which we augment with a financial sector
channeling funds from saving households to borrowing firms. We adopt a particular
overlapping-generations structure for the financial sector: financial intermediaries live
for two periods, with an old cohort exiting the market at each period and a new one
entering. This setup generates an endogenous default decision in the financial sector:
old intermediaries receive state-contingent earnings but face predetermined payments,
so that they choose to default in bad states of the world. To propagate financial stress to
1Morley and Panovska (2019) document that business cycles are asymmetric in other industrialized
economies as well.
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the economy, we add a financial friction in the form of sunk accounting costs paid by new
intermediaries entering in such a default state. This mechanism results in an endogenous
amplification of bad technology shocks, which generates business cycle asymmetry in our
model. To enrich the implications of the framework, we also introduce a tax on financial
intermediation, which has a Pigouvian interpretation since it helps correct the externality
arising from the financial sector. Bianchi (2011), Di Tella (2019), and Jeanne and Korinek
(2019) use very similar instruments as shortcuts for macro-prudential regulation.
We solve the model under the specific assumptions of log utility, a Cobb-Douglas
production function, and full capital depreciation. While these restrictions may not
be realistic, they allow us to provide an exact non-linear representation of the general
equilibrium of our economy and to obtain analytical results characterizing the behavior
of the model. We obtain the following five results.
First, we show that the financial friction in our model penalizes capital accumulation
in a way that mirrors the effects in DSGE models of negative shocks to investment
efficiency (Fisher, 2006; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010, 2011; Moura, 2018)
or capital quality (Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gourio, 2012; Brunnermeier and Sannikov,
2014). This finding provides a potential structural interpretation for these disturbances;
it also corroborates Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti’s (2011) view that investment
shocks proxy for time-varying frictions to financial intermediation.
Second, the analytical solution highlights that asymmetry in our economy originates
from a non-linearity due to the default decision: the distribution of default is truncated
from above at zero (no-default periods) and features a right tail of positive realizations
(default periods). Through the financial friction, this positive skew of default translates
into negative skew for capital, output, and consumption. This is the mechanism through
which our framework reproduces the stylized fact that US business cycles are negatively
skewed.
Third, we obtain a closed-form expression for the equilibrium lending-deposit spread
as a function of regulation, the financial friction, and current-period default. The spread
inherits the positive skew of default, which makes our model qualitatively consistent with
the empirical evidence provided in Ordonez (2013). Our framework also features the pos-
itive relationship between the size of financial frictions and the interest-rate asymmetry
documented by Ordonez.
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Fourth, we compute the probability that old financial intermediaries default in a given
period as a function of regulation, showing that tighter regulation reduces the frequency
of default events in the model.
Fifth, we analytically characterize the welfare loss caused by default using an accurate
approximation. We decompose the loss in two terms: the first captures steady-state costs
of regulation, which acts as a wedge on capital accumulation, and the second corresponds
to cyclical costs linked to default events. We show that tighter regulation worsens steady-
state costs but yields cyclical gains, and we prove that the cyclical gains of regulation
increases with the size of the financial friction propagating default. This demonstrates
that stronger financial frictions call for tighter regulation in our model.
Based on these analytical results, we then propose various quantitative experiments.
Although very stylized, the model is able to reproduce the skewness measured in US
data, and an additional advantage of the closed-form solution is that the simulations
involve no approximation error. We report impulse-response functions (IRFs) showing
that positive and negative technology shocks trigger asymmetric responses: the economy
behaves like a RBC model after a positive shock, but negative shocks push intermediaries
into default and generate financial stress, which amplifies the recession. We also analyze
the relationship between structural parameters and cyclical skewness in our model. In
particular, we show that asymmetry in quantities increases with the strength of the
financial friction, in line with the findings of Jensen, Ravn, and Santoro (2018) and
Jensen, Petrella, Ravn, and Santoro (2019). Finally, we numerically compute the welfare-
maximizing regulation scheme and show that it strongly reduces the occurrence of default
in the economy, as well as macroeconomic asymmetry.
Our paper lies at the intersection of several strands of literature. First, it belongs to
the large collection of work focusing on business cycle asymmetry. In terms of docu-
menting the skewness of US business cycles, we can mention Potter (1995) and Bloom,
Guvenen, and Salgado (2016) in addition to the papers cited above. Many authors
have also proposed theoretical explanations for this asymmetry, based on increasing re-
turns (Acemoglu and Scott, 1997), capacity constraints (Hansen and Prescott, 2005),
information constraints (Jovanovic, 2006; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2006), or
non-linear adjustment costs related to the labor market (Abbritti and Fahr, 2013). Com-
pared to these papers, our main novelty is to focus on financial default as a source of
non-linearity. Second, we contribute to the more recent literature linking business cycle
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asymmetry with financial factors. In particular, our model reproduces the association
between negative skew and financial stress documented by Adrian, Boyarchenko, and
Giannone (2019). Compared to Jensen, Petrella, Ravn, and Santoro (2019), we offer a
simpler analytical framework and we emphasize default rather than leverage constraints
as the potential source of asymmetry. Third and finally, our work relates to papers
studying the stabilization properties of macro-prudential regulation in general equilib-
rium, for instance De Walque, Pierrard, and Rouabah (2010), Angeloni and Faia (2013),
and Farhi and Werning (2016). However, we adopt a slightly different perspective: while
most papers focus on volatility and its interplay with financial frictions and regulation,
we put more weight on the welfare gains of reducing cyclical asymmetry by limiting the
size and occurrence of default tail events. In that spirit, our work also echoes Mendoza
and Yue (2012), who study the welfare consequences of default in small open economies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and provides the
closed-form solution. It also discusses important equilibrium properties that can be
characterized analytically. Section 3 provides the numerical experiments illustrating the
asymmetric behavior of the economy, including IRFs and comparative statics for skew-
ness statistics. Finally, Section 4 turns to welfare and regulation. Section 5 concludes.
To increase readability, we relegate most mathematical proofs to Appendices.
2. Model
This section introduces our model of a real economy, which includes a representative
household, a representative firm, and a financial sector channeling funds between the
household and the firm. There is also a government raising taxes from the financial
sector. The household owns all assets in the economy. The model has three key elements:
(i) financial intermediaries bear all risk and may default on their liabilities, (ii) there is
a social cost of default that intermediaries do not take into account, i.e. an externality,
and (iii) there is a tax on financial intermediation akin to a regulation instrument. We
impose conditions that guarantee an exact analytical solution and show how to solve the
model.
2.1. Setup. Except for a small twist related to default, the household side of the model
is fairly standard. At each period, the representative household consumes an amount ct
of the final good and saves dt in deposits issued by financial intermediaries. Thus, the
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problem is to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt ln(ct),
subject to the following budget constraint
ct + dt =
(
rdt−1 −∆t
)
dt−1 + π
c
t + π
f
t + tt.
Here, E0 is the expectation operator conditional on date-0 information, β ∈ [0, 1[ is the
subjective discount factor, rdt−1 is the (predetermined) gross return on deposits, π
c
t is
corporate profits, πft is financial profit, and tt is a lump-sum transfer from the govern-
ment. The only unusual term in the budget constraint is ∆t, with ∆tdt−1 capturing the
financial loss incurred by the household when intermediaries default on their liabilities.
We provide a microfounded expression for ∆t in equation (4) below. For now, we just
define the default rate on financial liabilities as
∆tdt−1
rdt−1dt−1
=
∆t
rdt−1
. (1)
The consumption-saving plan is characterized by the Euler equation
1 = βEt
(
rdt −∆t+1
)
ct
ct+1
.
The production side is also standard. The representative firm uses the kt−1 units of
capital available at date t to produce the final good in quantity
yt = ǫtk
α
t−1,
where α ∈ ]0, 1[. Productivity evolves according to
ǫt = ǫ
ρ
t−1 exp(ut),
with ρ ∈ [0, 1[, ut ∼ N(µ, σ
2), and σ ≥ 0. Corporate profits are given by
πct = ǫtk
α
t−1 − r
k
t kt−1
and the production plan verifies
αǫtk
α−1
t−1 = r
k
t .
To engineer endogenous default events with macroeconomic effects while preserving
an exact analytical solution, our modeling of financial intermediation is more involved.
We postulate an overlapping-generations structure: intermediaries live for two periods so
that, at each date, an old generation exits the market and a new cohort enters. Within
this 2-period framework, we rely on three mechanisms:
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• First, financial intermediaries bear all risk in the economy. Formally, we assume
that intermediaries pay a predetermined return on their deposit liabilities and
earn a return linked to the current state of technology on their assets.2 As
a result, bad technology shocks translate into unexpected lower profits in the
financial sector, given predetermined costs.
• Second, it must be possible for financial intermediaries to default endogenously in
bad states of the world. Our 2-period structure makes this straightforward: old
intermediaries leave the economy at the end of each period and do not internalize
future costs, so that they choose to default when bad shocks generate negative
profits in the financial sector. We also assume that the government seizes any
positive profit in case of default, which ensures that old intermediaries default
only when their profits are negative.
• Third, new intermediaries must pay a cost when entering an economy in a state
with default. This additional friction, which resembles sunk auditing or account-
ing costs, ensures that financial stress generates social costs for the economy.
Similar mechanisms can be found in, among others, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997),
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and Malherbe (2019). Without it, de-
fault would simply reallocate household income away from deposit earnings and
toward profit earnings in a lump-sum fashion, with no effect on equilibrium allo-
cations.
Digging into the details, young financial intermediaries entering the market at date t
raise an amount dt of deposits from the household, purchase kt units of capital, and lend
these to the firm. When the economy is in a default state, that is when ∆t > 0, young
intermediaries must also pay an auditing cost equal to a fraction φ∆t of their balance
sheet, with φ ≥ 0. As a result, the aggregate balance sheet of financial intermediaries at
the end of period t verifies
(1 + φ∆t)kt = dt. (2)
In the following, we call φ the financial friction because it determines the size of the eco-
nomic costs associated with default in our model. This friction generates an externality
in our model because default is decided by old intermediaries that do not to take into
2Models with financial frictions typically postulate predetermined deposit rates; see for instance
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Iacoviello (2005), or Gertler and Karadi (2011).
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account the feedback effects on other agents, in particular on the financing cost of new
intermediaries.
In addition, new intermediaries have to pay a lump-sum tax τ kt+1 to the government
in the next period. This tax is the policy instrument in our model and it has a direct
Pigouvian interpretation, since it helps correct the externality arising from the financial
sector. It has also implications similar to standard capital requirements: we show below
that a higher tax leads to a higher equilibrium spread between the lending and deposit
rates and to a lower probability of default, so that the tax makes it possible to limit the
riskiness of the financial sector. Bianchi (2011), Di Tella (2019), and Jeanne and Korinek
(2019) use a similar shortcut to represent macro-prudential regulation. We assume that
the tax is rebated lump sum to households within the period, so that the government
budget constraint verifies
tt = τ
k
t .
At date t+ 1, old intermediaries earn rkt+1kt from their assets (we assume full capital
depreciation) and have to pay rdt dt to the household and τ
k
t+1 to the government. Old
intermediaries may choose to default on their deposit liabilities, in which case they
instead transfer their pre-tax income to the household. In contrast, they cannot default
vis-a`-vis the government: this assumption is consistent with the state being a senior
creditor and ensures that the policy instrument remains effective in the model.3 As a
result, the profit of old intermediaries at date t+ 1 is given by
πft+1 = max
(
rkt+1kt − r
d
t dt − τ
k
t+1, −τ
k
t+1
)
, (3)
where the first argument of the max operator corresponds to the no-default case and the
second argument to the default case. It is immediate that intermediaries default only
when asset income is below debt servicing costs:
rkt+1kt < r
d
t dt,
a situation we interpret as insolvency in the financial sector. Shifting time indexes
backward, the size of default at date t verifies
max
(
0, rdt−1dt−1 − r
k
t kt−1
)
.
3Usually, the highest priority claim in liquidation goes to fees and outstanding wages, which do
not appear here. The state and tax collectors come next. Remaining creditors are then ranked in a
descending order of seniority.
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From the household budget constraint, we know that default is also equal to ∆tdt−1,
which implies
∆t = max
(
0, rdt−1 − r
k
t
kt−1
dt−1
)
. (4)
The representative household owns financial intermediaries, so that free entry in the
market for intermediaries translates into the expected zero-profit condition:
βEt
(
ct
ct+1
πft+1
)
= 0. (5)
Finally, we note that our default model is reminiscent of the sovereign default literature
(e.g. Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006; Arellano, 2008; Mendoza and Yue, 2012). In these
papers, a country chooses to default when the short-term gains of not reimbursing debt
are higher than the long-term costs, typically linked to exclusion from world financial
markets for a number of periods. In our model, intermediaries default when there is an
immediate advantage, since they exit immediately and do not internalize future costs.
In addition, in the sovereign default literature, a country going into default experiences
productivity losses reflecting inefficiencies linked to financial stress. In our economy,
the financial friction φ creates a similar mechanism and governs the general equilibrium
effects of default.
2.2. Solution. Gathering and rearranging the equations, the equilibrium of our model
is characterized by the following system:
(6)

∆t = max
(
rdt−1 −
rkt
1 + φ∆t−1
, 0
)
, (6a)
ct + (1 + φ∆t)kt = ǫtk
α
t−1, (6b)
βEt
[(
rdt −∆t+1
)
ct
ct+1
]
= 1, (6c)
rkt = αǫtk
α−1
t−1 , (6d)
Etmax
[
β
ct
ct+1
(
rkt+1 − [1 + φ∆t]r
d
t
)
, 0
]
= Et β
ct
ct+1
τ kt+1
kt
, (6e)
ǫt = ǫ
ρ
t−1 exp(ut), ut ∼ N(µ, σ
2). (6f)
These equations highlight the three mechanisms we use to engineer default. First, the
expression for ∆t in (6a) makes it clear how financial intermediaries bear all aggregate
risk: at each period, their cost is given in the form of predetermined deposit rates, but
their earnings respond to current productivity developments via the return to capital.
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Second, the same equation shows that intermediates default when the return to capital,
appropriately weighted, is not sufficient to cover their liability cost. Third, the financial
friction φ∆tkt in the resource constraint (6b) propagates default to aggregate variables.
Equation (6e), which combines equations (3) and (5), corresponds to the zero-profit
condition in the market for intermediation and defines the equilibrium deposit rate rdt . It
shows why the tax τ kt+1 can be interpreted as a regulatory instrument, since an increase
in τ kt+1 implies, ceteris paribus, a higher lending-deposit spread and a lower probability
of default. Moreover, the left-hand side of equation (6e) is the expectation of a random
variable with support over positive values, so that it has to be strictly positive. As a
result, system (6) is well defined only when τ kt+1 > 0 ensures that the right-hand side
is also above zero. From an economic perspective, the lending-deposit spread becomes
irrelevant for financial intermediaries as τ kt+1 → 0, since in that case they may propose an
infinitely high deposit rate, default at each period, and still earn a non-negative profit.
However, this generates huge social costs and both capital and consumption converge
to zero, so that the economy collapses. Below, we assume that τ kt+1 > 0 to avoid this
pathological equilibrium.4
We also note how the max operator generates asymmetric effects of positive and neg-
ative productivity shocks in our model. A surprise increase in productivity raises the
marginal product of capital and the income of old financial intermediaries, which are
then solvable and pay back their debt. As a result, there is no default and new interme-
diaries face no entry cost. On the other hand, a surprise fall in productivity may push
old intermediaries into default, increasing costs for new entrants and weighing on capital
accumulation.
Below, we provide an analytical solution to system (6) that preserves this non-linearity.
To build that solution, we impose a specific form on the policy instrument τ kt that pro-
vides a factorization of the free-entry condition in the market for financial intermediation:
Assumption 1. The policy instrument is given by
τ kt = τ r
k
t kt−1,
4This mechanism, which allows unregulated financial intermediaries to offer unsustainable returns on
their liabilities (excessive risk taking) and end up defaulting (financial collapse) with negative spillovers
to the whole economy, is close to the usual narrative of the 2008 financial crisis (see, among others,
Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein, 2011).
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with
τ ≡ τ(A, σ) = Φ
(
A
σ
−
σ
2
)
− Φ
(
A
σ
−
3σ
2
)
exp(σ2 − A) > 0,
where A ∈ ]0,∞[ if σ = 0 and A ∈ ]−∞,∞[ if σ > 0 and Φ(.) is the cdf of the standard
normal distribution.
Assumption 1 is sufficient to obtain an exact solution. It requires the policy instrument
τ kt to be a tax on capital income, with constant rate τ > 0. To keep an exact solution, τ
has to depend on the volatility parameter σ, so we introduce an additional coefficient A
to index the extent of regulation: given a value of σ, the policymaker can choose a value
for τ by varying A. In light of this correspondence, from now on we refer to either τ and
A as the policy instrument, depending on the context. The mapping from the desired τ
to the implied A has no closed form. However, we prove in Appendix B that τ(A, 0) =
1 − 1/ exp(A), limA→−∞ τ(A, σ) = 0, limA→∞ τ(A, σ) = 1, and ∂τ(A, σ)/∂A > 0 when
σ > 0. Figure 9 in Appendix B provides a graphical illustration of the mapping between
A and τ . Finally, Assumption 1 ensures that τ kt > 0, so that the free-entry condition in
system (6) is well defined.
An obvious caveat from Assumption 1 is that defining τ as a function of σ makes it
difficult to isolate the economic effects of volatility in our model. In particular, com-
parative statics with respect to σ entail simultaneous movement in the tax rate, which
mixes the consequences of a change in the variance of the technology shock with those of
a change in regulation. As a result, we refrain from considering variations in σ in what
follows; instead, we only consider independent movements in the other model parameters
for a given level of volatility.
We are now in position to state:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, system (6) has the closed-form solution
(DEF )

ct = [1− αβ(1− τ)] ǫtk
α
t−1, (7a)
kt =
αβ
1 + φ∆t
(1− τ) ǫtk
α
t−1, (7b)
∆t =
αǫtk
α−1
t−1
1 + φ∆t−1
max
[
exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
− ut − A
)
− 1, 0
]
, (7c)
ǫt = ǫ
ρ
t−1 exp(ut), ut ∼ N(µ, σ
2). (7d)
Proof. See Appendix C. 
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2.3. Equilibrium properties. Finding a closed-form solution allows us to highlight an-
alytically some important properties of the general equilibrium of our economy featuring
default and financial frictions.
First, equation (7a) indicates that neither default nor the financial friction φ affect the
equilibrium saving rate, given by αβ(1− τ). Indeed, we find a constant saving rate just
as in the analytical RBC model. On the other hand, the saving rate is decreasing in τ ,
reflecting that tighter regulation weighs on capital accumulation.
Second, the law of motion of capital (7b) is changed in a way that makes our economy
observationally equivalent to a RBC model with shocks to investment efficiency (Fisher,
2006; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010, 2011; Moura, 2018) or capital quality
(Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gourio, 2012; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014). Indeed,
the financial friction arising from default lowers the amount of productive capital ob-
tained from each unit of savings, which exactly mirrors the effect of negative investment
efficiency shocks. We formally prove this equivalence in Appendix D, in which we also
demonstrate the correspondence with capital quality shocks in our economy with full
capital depreciation. Thus, our framework provides a potential micro-foundation for
both investment efficiency and capital quality shocks in DSGE models. In particular,
it rationalizes why these shocks proxy well for financial factors: in our setup, a nega-
tive productivity shock triggering default induces at the same time a fall in aggregate
quantities, a rise in credit spreads, and a wedge that resembles investment efficiency and
capital quality shocks (see Figure 1 below for impulse-response functions).
Third, equation (7c) shows that our analytical solution preserves the asymmetry of the
model. The max operator truncates the equilibrium distribution of the default variable
∆t to non-negative values, which implies a right tail and a positive skew when default
is occasional. In that case, an important mass of the distribution lies at zero while the
tail corresponds to positive values. In turn, the positive skew for ∆t translates into a
negative skew for capital: most of the time default is equal to zero and the transformation
of investment into capital is unharmed, but bad shocks cause financial intermediaries to
default and the associated social costs generate abnormally low capital realizations in the
left tail of the distribution. Finally, given the log-linear production function and decision
rule for consumption, both output and consumption (in logs) inherit the negative skew of
capital. It follows that our model is able to reproduce the negative skewness of aggregate
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macroeconomic time series documented by the literature initiated by Neftci (1984), while
maintaining the assumption of symmetric Gaussian productivity shocks.5
Fourth, the model also generates asymmetry in the spread between the lending and
deposit rates. We show in Appendix C that the equilibrium spread between the expected
return on credit and on deposits between t and t+ 1 verifies
st ≡
Etr
k
t+1
rdt
= exp(A)(1 + φ∆t). (8)
The spread increases in the default variable ∆t when there are financial frictions (φ > 0),
reflecting higher entry costs facing new intermediaries in bad states of the world. The
relationship is linear, so that st inherits the asymmetry of ∆t: credit spreads have a
positive skew when defaults are rare events. Accordingly, our model is consistent with
the positive skewness of spreads in both advanced and emerging economies found by
Ordonez (2013). Since the strength of the link between st and ∆t depends on φ, our
framework is also consistent with the positive relationship between the extent of financial
frictions and interest rate asymmetry that Ordonez finds in the data.
Fifth, the probability that default occurs at any given date can be computed as
Pr[default] = Pr
[
rkt+1kt − r
d
t dt < 0
]
= Pr
[
exp(ut) < exp(µ+ σ
2/2− A)
]
= Pr [exp(ut) < E exp(ut − A)] = Φ
(
σ
2
−
A
σ
)
. (9)
This expression follows from the definition of the equilibrium spread (see Appendix C).
Thanks to our 2-period overlapping-generations structure, the probability of default
depends on neither current nor past economic conditions, which is key for analytical
tractability. In addition, the probability of default decreases with A, that is with τ ac-
cording to Assumption 1: tighter regulation lowers the occurrence of default events in
our model. More precisely, when σ > 0 and A→ −∞, then τ → 0 and Pr[default]→ 1,
meaning that intermediaries always default when they are not regulated. When A = 0,
τ is slightly positive (for instance τ = 1.9% when σ = 0.05) and Pr[default] ≈ 50%.
When A → ∞, τ → 1 and default never happens. Finally, for A > 0 and in the limit
case of σ → 0, Pr[default] → 0, implying that intermediaries never default when the
economy is deterministic.
5Altug, Ashley, and Patterson (1999) find no evidence of non-linearity in the Solow residual in the
US economy.
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Sixth, we can use equation (7c) and the balance sheet identity (2) to compute the
amount defaulted by old intermediaries in each period as
∆tdt−1 = αǫtk
α
t−1max
[
exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
− ut − A
)
− 1, 0
]
. (10)
The terms on the right-hand side show that in our model the size of default depends on
two features. The first is the scale of the economy, as measured by current production
ǫtk
α
t−1, with larger economies being prone to potentially larger defaults. The second is
the surprise in current productivity developments, as measured by the difference between
the innovation ut and its expected value augmented by A (which directly maps into
the regulation instrument τ). Because of the max operator, only negative productivity
surprises induce default; positive surprises instead trigger an unexpected rise in financial
profits.
Finally, equations (8), (9), and (10) clarify how regulation affects the equilibrium of our
model. In particular, tighter regulation through higher values of A (and τ) is associated
with larger credit spreads that increase profits in the financial sector (equation (8)).
As a result, the probability of default falls (equation (9)) and defaults are of limited
value when they occur (equation (10)). These channels make the regulation tradeoff
transparent in our model: on the one hand, regulation lowers the probability and the
severity of default events, which is beneficial for the economy; on the other hand, this
comes at the cost of larger credit spreads that distort capital accumulation and weigh on
the economy. Obviously, the strength of the financial friction φ is crucial to determine
whether tightening the regulation entails more advantages than drawbacks in a given
economy.
Overall, our model combines two wedges that distort capital accumulation. The first
reflects the social costs of default: it originates from the financial friction φ and generates
business-cycle asymmetry. The second wedge arises from regulation: it captures the effect
of the tax rate τ on the equilibrium consumption-saving tradeoff and does not generate
asymmetry in itself. However, these two wedges are not independent because tighter
regulation lowers the frequency and average size of default events in the model. Below,
we analyze the interactions between these wedges in more detail.
2.4. Central planner benchmark. In the rest of the paper, we explore some equilib-
rium properties of our non-linear model (DEF ), with a focus on asymmetry, welfare, and
regulation. We need a benchmark for these analyses, and we take it to be the optimal
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allocation chosen by a benevolent central planner maximizing E0
∑
∞
t=0 β
t ln(ct) subject
to the resource constraint ct + kt = ǫtk
α
t−1. It is straightforward to show:
Proposition 2. The central planner allocation verifies (McCallum, 1988)
(CP )

kt = αβǫtk
α
t−1,
ct = (1− αβ)ǫtk
α
t−1,
ǫt = ǫ
ρ
t−1 exp(ut), ut ∼ N(µ, σ
2).
Since we impose τ kt > 0, Model (DEF ) always features an inefficiency distorting
capital accumulation. As a result, it is not possible to obtain the efficient allocation as
an equilibrium outcome. However, the equilibrium allocation in Model (DEF ) becomes
arbitrarily close to the efficient outcome when there is no financial friction (φ = 0) and
when the regulation distortion vanishes (τ → 0).
3. Financial Frictions and Business Cycle Asymmetry
This section analyses how the interplay of endogenous default and financial frictions
generates business cycle asymmetry in our model. We proceed in three steps. First, we
parametrize the model. Second, we provide IRFs highlighting the asymmetric effects of
positive and negative technology shocks in our setup, as well as the amplification arising
from default and financial frictions. Third, we assess the role of key parameters — the
financial friction φ and regulation τ — in shaping the model asymmetry.
3.1. Parametrization. Our assumption of full capital depreciation makes it difficult to
come up with a proper calibration strategy, so instead we follow a different road and
propose an illustrative parametrization.
We partition the model parameters in two sets. The first contains parameters for
which it is relatively easy to pick reference values from the literature: these include
the Cobb-Douglas exponent, the subjective discount factor, and the persistence of the
technology process, which we set at α = 0.33, β = 0.97, and ρ = 0.90.
The second set contains parameters either specific to our economy or that significantly
affect the asymmetry. For this group of parameters, we choose values that generate rel-
atively large effects in order to help identify the workings of the model. More precisely,
we set the financial friction at φ = 4 and we assume that the standard deviation of
technology shocks is σ = 0.05, 5 times higher than the usual value of 0.01 in quarterly
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Table 1. Parametrization
Parameter Symbol Value
Discount factor β 0.97
Cobb-Douglas exponent α 0.33
Technology shock: persistence ρ 0.90
Technology shock: standard deviation σ 0.05
Financial friction φ 4.00
Regulation parameter A 0.0013
Implied tax rate τ 0.0194
models. Thus, our parametrization roughly targets an annual frequency, which is con-
sistent with the value we choose for β. Finally, we adjust the regulation parameter A to
obtain a 50% probability of default at each date, which yields A = σ2/2 = 0.0013 (see
equation (9)). The implied value of the tax rate is τ = 1.94%. One advantage of this
particular choice is that negative technology shocks, however small, will push financial
intermediaries into default.6 Our parametrization also implies an average GDP cost of
default of 2%, well below the 4.5% annual GDP cost of the 2007-2011 US financial crisis
estimated by Laeven and Valencia (2018).7 Table 1 reports the value assigned to each
parameter.
This parametrization makes our model roughly consistent with the level of asymmetry
measured in US data.8 For instance, the skewness of log GDP was −0.24 between
1953 and 2018, and −0.44 between 1980 and 2018. These estimates suggest that the
asymmetry of US GDP has been increasing in recent years, in line with the findings of
Jensen, Petrella, Ravn, and Santoro (2019). When parametrized according to the entries
in Table 1, our model implies the intermediary value of−0.35, well in the range supported
6Default would only occur for sufficiently negative shocks if the probability of default was below 50%,
while default could occur even in presence of positive shocks if the probability was above 50%.
7In the model, the social cost depends on the average size of default E(∆tkt) rather than just on
the frequency of default. In that spirit, our setup is close to the “continuous default rate” model of
Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2005) in which banks default at each period but in varying degrees.
8We use time series extracted from the FRED database. Output is annual real GDP in chained 2012
dollars (GDPC1), while the credit spread is the yearly average of Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond
yield relative to the yield on 10-year treasury bonds (BAA10YM). We remove the long-run trend of
GDP using the HP filter with smoothing parameter 100, the standard value for annual series.
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by the data. As for the credit spread, it has a positive skewness of 0.38 between 1953 and
2018, and of 0.82 in the more recent 1980-2018 period. Our parametrization overshoots
these values, as it generates a skew of 1.59 for the spread. However, it is qualitatively
consistent with spreads having a positive skew in the data.
3.2. Asymmetric effects of technology shocks. Based on this parametrization, we
compute the equilibrium path of the model following positive and negative technology
shocks. We choose the deterministic steady state as the initial condition, so that the
level of default was always zero in the past, and we hit the economy with a one-time,
one-standard-deviation technology shock, either positive or negative. We report the
resulting IRFs in Figure 1. Equation (7a) demonstrates that consumption and output
have identical dynamics in our model, and we report the response of consumption only.
The dashed red lines represent the dynamic effects induced by the positive shock.
These are pretty standard. Productivity increases by 5% on impact and then gradually
returns to its long-run level. Higher productivity leads to an immediate rise in pro-
duction of similar magnitude, which is absorbed by increased levels of consumption and
investment. The additional units of capital available for future production, together with
the persistence of the technology shock, slightly amplifies the economy’s response in the
short run and generates hump-shaped dynamics in capital, consumption, and output.
There is no default and the lending-deposit spread is constant. As a result, our model
displays exactly the same movements as the central planner benchmark.
The solid blue lines represent the economy’s response to the negative technology shock.
There is a clear asymmetry compared to the effects of the positive shock, as well as
significant amplification. The unexpected fall in productivity lowers the return to capital
and the income of financial intermediaries. As a result, intermediaries go into default:
the default rate on financial liabilities almost reaches 5%. Default occurs only when the
shock hits the economy, since there is no surprise afterward. However, the effects are
long lasting. Through the financial friction, default entails a large social cost that weighs
on investment, which drops by 20% on impact — four times more than productivity.
Consumption also falls immediately, though this only reflects lower productivity (recall
that the equilibrium saving rate is constant). Finally, the financial friction also causes
a 20-point increase in the lending-deposit spread. At future dates, there are negative
spillovers due to the lower capital levels and consumption reaches a trough of −10% two
periods after the shock. The economy then gradually returns to its steady state.
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Figure 1. Asymmetric effects of technology shocks.
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d
t−1dt−1) =
∆t/r
d
t−1 and the spread is in deviation from its deterministic steady-state value exp(A). See
Table 1 for the parametrization.
These IRFs highlight two key properties of our model. First, positive and negative
technology shocks generate asymmetric responses from the endogenous variables because
of the non-linearity of default. Second, the financial friction provides an amplification
mechanism for negative shocks, both on impact and in later periods. All amplification
originates from the social cost associated with the financial friction: as discussed in
Section 2.1, setting φ = 0 would eliminate both the asymmetry and the amplification
related to default.
3.3. Forces shaping asymmetry. We now explore in more detail how selected param-
eters contribute to the asymmetric behavior of our the model. We focus on the financial
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friction φ and regulation τ : the first determines the strength of the negative spillovers
from default, while the second governs the probability of default (recall equation (9)).9
We conduct various experiments simulating the model, changing one parameter at a
time and evaluating asymmetry using skewness statistics based on artificial samples of
500, 000 periods. Throughout, we study the log of the capital stock, which maps directly
into output given the production structure while avoiding issues related to the treatment
of default costs that would arise if we studied GDP instead. We also consider the equilib-
rium lending-deposit spread. Finally, we note that the central planner benchmark yields
symmetric distributions for all variables, with zero skewness for all parameter values.
3.3.1. Financial friction φ. We start by varying the strength of the financial friction in
the model, i.e. parameter φ. Greater friction leaves the probability of default unchanged
but associates default events with larger social costs that weigh more on capital accu-
mulation. As a result, we expect higher values of φ to correspond to a more negatively
skewed distribution for equilibrium log capital, and a more positively skewed distribution
for the lending-deposit spread.
Figure 2 corroborates these insights. The top panel shows a decreasing relationship
between φ and the skewness of capital in our model. When φ = 0, default arises once
every two periods on average but it does not distort the equilibrium distribution of log
capital, which is symmetric just as in the central planner benchmark. In that case,
the model has no friction able to propagate financial stress to aggregate quantities and
default is just a lump-sum transfer. As φ rises, stronger friction makes default more costly
and the distribution of capital has an increasingly negative skewness. The intuition is
straightforward: higher values of φ amplify the economy’s response to bad technology
shocks without affecting the response to good shocks, which induces a longer left tail in
the distribution of aggregate quantities.
The bottom panel indicates that the skewness of the lending-deposit spread increases
slightly with φ. This is consistent with equation (8), which shows that larger social
costs translate into higher equilibrium credit spreads. The positive relationship between
the skew of credit spreads and the strength of financial frictions is also in line with the
empirical findings reported in Ordonez (2013). There is an interesting discontinuity at
φ = 0. Without financial frictions, the spread is not affected by default and remains
9As explained above, we do not consider experiments varying volatility σ because of its simultaneous
effect on regulation τ .
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Figure 2. Relationship between financial friction φ and asymmetry.
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Notes. The figure shows the skewness of log capital and the credit spread as a
function of the financial friction φ, with other model parameters fixed at the values
described in Table 1. Statistics computed on samples with 500, 000 observations.
constant; as a result, its skew is not defined even though default ∆t has a positive skew.
For any φ > 0, however small, the spread inherits the asymmetry of ∆t and the financial
friction just acts as an amplifying factor.
3.3.2. Regulation τ . We now consider the effect of regulation on asymmetry. From a
practical perspective, we vary parameter A in Assumption 1 but we report the results
as functions of the tax-like composite parameter τ to ease interpretation. Equation (9)
shows that tighter regulation reduces the equilibrium probability of default at any volatil-
ity level. As a result, one could expect a negative effect of τ on asymmetry: as regulation
increases, defaults occur less often and particularly low realizations of log capital are
scarcer, as are high realizations of the lending-deposit spread.
Figure 3 shows that the relationship between regulation and asymmetry is more com-
plicated in our model. The top panel indicates a U-like relationship between τ and
the skew of log capital: asymmetry is close to zero when regulation is tight, increases
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Figure 3. Relationship between regulation τ and asymmetry.
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Notes. The figure shows the skewness of log capital and the credit spread as a
function of regulation τ , with other model parameters fixed at the values described
in Table 1. Statistics computed on samples with 500, 000 observations.
progressively as τ decreases, before flattening out and eventually falling as regulation be-
comes very lenient. On the contrary, the central panel displays an increasing relationship
between the skew of the spread and the tightness of regulation.
The behavior of capital asymmetry is best understood by reading the chart from right
to left, that is starting from tight regulation and moving toward less regulated economies.
When τ is high, regulation is strong enough to prevent default in equilibrium. As a result,
the probability of default is essentially zero and log capital has a symmetric distribution.
Relaxing regulation by lowering τ entails an increase in the frequency of default, so that
social costs weigh on intermediation more often and generate lower realizations of capital.
The skewness of log capital falls toward more negative values, signaling that asymmetry
increases. As regulation becomes lenient, the probability of default increases: social costs
are incurred more often, so that the corresponding low values of capital become more
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Figure 4. Distribution of credit spreads for different regulation τ .
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regulation τ . Statistics computed on samples with 500, 000 observations.
of a norm and less of a tail realization. This explains why skewness statistics recover
when τ falls enough: there is initially a reduction in negative skew as the left tail of the
distribution is compressed, which eventually turns into positive skew as default becomes
the norm and rare non-default periods generate a right tail instead.
The behavior of credit spreads follows from equations (8) and (9), which show that the
probability of default declines as regulation increases and that the lending-deposit spread
is constant when financial intermediaries do not default. Hence, tightening regulation
concentrates the distribution of credit spreads around the no-default constant value,
leaving a thinner right tail of larger spreads. We illustrate this concentration pattern
in Figure 4, which reports the distribution of credit spreads for increasing values of τ .
In the top panel, regulation is lax and default occurs almost every period, so that the
distribution of spreads has a wide support. In the lower panels, regulation becomes
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tighter and the no-default threshold absorbs more of the distribution as the right tail
flattens. As Figure 3 shows, this specific form of asymmetry leads to large skewness
statistics for credit spreads.
4. Welfare and Regulation
So far, we have proposed a positive analysis of how frictions give rise to cyclical
asymmetry in our model. In this final section, we take a different perspective: frictions
generate inefficiencies and yield a suboptimal equilibrium allocation, which justifies a
normative analysis. Building on our analytical solution, we provide an exact expression
for welfare and use it to study the costs of default. To push the computations further, we
introduce an approximation that preserves the non-linearity of the max operator. Finally,
we resort to numerical simulations to characterize the welfare-maximizing regulation
policy and its effects on welfare and asymmetry.10
4.1. Analytical results. As in Lester, Pries, and Sims (2014), we focus on uncondi-
tional welfare as measured by the average value function of the representative household.
Using the results from Propositions 1 and 2, straightforward algebra demonstrates that,
in Models (CP ) and (DEF ), welfare verifies
(1− α)(1− β)WCP = (1− α) ln(1− αβ) + α ln(αβ) +
µ
1− ρ
(1− α)(1− β)WDEF = (1− α)(1− β)WCP
+(1− α) ln
[
1− αβ(1− τ)
1− αβ
]
+ α ln(1− τ)− αE ln(1 + φ∆t),
where E is the unconditional expectation operator. It follows that the welfare difference
between Models (DEF ) and (CP ) is given by
(1− α)(1− β) (WDEF −WCP ) = −
[
g(τ)︸︷︷︸
steady-state cost
+ αE ln(1 + φ∆t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cyclical cost
]
, (11)
where
g(τ) = (1− α) ln
[
1− αβ
1− αβ(1− τ)
]
− α ln(1− τ).
We show in Appendix E that g(τ) > 0 for τ ∈ [0, 1[.
The next proposition summarizes the welfare ranking between the central planner
benchmark and the economy with default:
10In the following, we refer to this welfare-maximizing policy as the optimal policy, keeping implicit
that it is only constrained-optimal and does not restore the efficient central-planner allocation.
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Proposition 3. For all σ ≥ 0 and τ(A, σ) ∈ ]0, 1[, we have
WDEF <WCP .
In addition, WDEF → WCP when σ = 0 and τ → 0, and WDEF → WCP when φ = 0
and τ → 0.
Proof. See Appendix E. 
Proposition 3 shows that welfare is always lower in the model with default. Equa-
tion (11) decomposes this welfare loss into two sources. First, there is a cost g(τ)
representing the distortion to capital accumulation induced by regulation. We refer to
it as the steady-state cost because tighter regulation reduces the average levels of GDP,
consumption, and capital even in a deterministic economy without default. Second, there
is a cost αE ln(1+ φ∆t) linked to default events. It is strictly positive when uncertainty
generates occasional default events (σ > 0) and when default is amplified by financial
frictions (φ > 0). In particular, this cost encapsulates the negative welfare consequences
of second- and third-order moments induced by uncertainty, which explains why we refer
to it as the cyclical cost. In the limiting cases in which default does not occur (σ = 0) or
does not propagate (φ = 0), only the regulation cost matters and the economy converges
to the central planner allocation when τ → 0. Obviously, this discussion neglects the
key point that tighter regulation also lowers the probability and size of default, as well
as the related social costs. We discuss this point below.
The literature about financial regulation typically finds that tighter regulation yields
long-term gains by lowering default risks, at the expense of short-run losses representing
the economic costs of, e.g., increasing capital requirements (Van den Heuvel, 2008; Clerc,
Derviz, Mendicino, Moyen, Nikolov, Stracca, Suarez, and Vardoulakis, 2015; Mendicino,
Nikolov, Suarez, and Supera, 2018). Our model, which displays no transitional dynamics
after a change in τ , follows a different logic. In particular, both the costs of tighter
regulation and the welfare gains materialize immediately when τ increases: on the one
hand, financial intermediation becomes at once more costly; on the other hand, it also
becomes safer as the probability of default falls. Thus, the trade-off is not between
a short-term cost and a long-term gain, but between a cost and a gain that will be
experienced today and at all future dates.
It is difficult to obtain further analytical results about welfare because the cost E ln(1+
φ∆t) in equation (11) cannot be explicitly written in terms of structural parameters.
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Still, we can make some progress at the cost of a slight approximation described in the
following:
Assumption 2. The equilibrium is such that
(A1) ln(1 + φ∆t) ≈ φ∆t;
(A2) ∆t∆t−1 ≈ 0;
(A3) ǫρt−1k
α−1
t−1 is accurately approximated by a first-order Taylor expansion around the
deterministic steady state;
(A4) φ < 1/θ, where
θ =
exp (σ2/2) [exp(−A)Φ (σ/2− A/σ)− Φ (−σ/2− A/σ)]
β(1− τ)
> 0.
Assumption 2 essentially requires that the economy is not too volatile around its
deterministic steady state, so that the linearizations involved in (A1) and (A3) remain
accurate; that defaults are not too large, so that (A2) holds; and that the financial
friction is not too strong, so that (A4) is verified. At the same time, the assumption
preserves the non-linearity of the max operator and thus the asymmetry due to default.
We show in Appendix F that the resulting approximation error is small for a wide range
of parameter values.
Also in Appendix F, we demonstrate that under Assumption 2 the cyclical cost in
equation (11) simplifies to
αE ln(1 + φ∆t) ≈
αφθ
1− φθ
,
where (A4) from Assumption 2 ensures that the right-hand side is positive. We can then
show:
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2,
∂E ln(1 + φ∆t)
∂φ
> 0,
∂E ln(1 + φ∆t)
∂τ
< 0,
∂2E ln(1 + φ∆t)
∂τ∂φ
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix G. 
Given equation (11), Proposition 4 makes three statements valid in the vicinity of the
deterministic steady state of our model.
First, higher financial frictions φ deteriorate welfare in Model (DEF ), since they
amplify the cyclical cost. This is not surprising, as stronger frictions make default events
more costly to the economy.
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Second, there is a clear tradeoff related to regulation. On the one hand, tighter
regulation impairs welfare through g(τ), since ∂g(τ)/∂τ > 0. This is a steady-state cost
that reflects the distortion to capital accumulation induced by regulation. On the other
hand, tighter regulation improves welfare by mitigating the social costs of default, as
can be seen from the negative response of E ln(1 + φ∆t) to an increase in τ . This is a
cyclical effect that captures the lower frequency and smaller size of default events in a
regulated economy.
Third, the cyclical effect is more important when financial frictions are high, as shown
by the cross-partial derivative of E ln(1 + φ∆t) with respect to φ and τ . Defining the
optimal policy as the one balancing positive and negative effects on welfare, our ana-
lytic argument makes it clear that higher financial frictions justify tighter regulation:
the cyclical cost reduction from increasing τ is larger, while the steady-state cost is
unchanged.
4.2. Numerical results. Finally, we document the properties of optimal regulation in
our model using numerical analyses. As before, we base the simulations on artificial
samples with 500, 000 periods.
In our benchmark parametrization, we find that the welfare function is concave in
the regulation instrument τ .11 This is clear from Figure 5, which reports the welfare
losses resulting from varying τ (more precisely A) while keeping other model parameters
constant at the values in Table 1. Concavity of welfare essentially follows from the two
costs apparent in equation (11). For low values of τ , regulation is lenient: as a result,
the steady-state distortion is small while the cyclical costs associated with default are
important, so that there are welfare gains from tightening regulation. In contrast, when
τ is high regulation is tight so default occurs rarely: in this case, the distortions on
capital accumulation are stronger and deregulation improves welfare.
Because of concavity, there exists an interior value of τ that maximizes welfare in Model
(DEF ). In our baseline parametrization, this optimal regulation instrument corresponds
to an (annual) tax rate of τ ⋆ = 8.28%. More generally, optimal regulation balances the
welfare effects of marginally raising or lowering the tax rate: at the optimal level τ ⋆, the
cyclical welfare benefit of limiting the negative consequences of default by raising the
tax rate is equal to the steady-state welfare cost of larger capital distortions.
11We checked numerically that welfare being concave in τ is a robust implication of our model by
varying the parameters φ and σ.
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Figure 5. Welfare as a function of the tax instrument τ .
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Notes. The figure shows the welfare loss resulting from varying the regulation
instrument τ , with other model parameters fixed at the values described in Ta-
ble 1. Welfare losses are expressed as percent deviations from the central planner
benchmark WCP . Statistics computed on samples with 500, 000 observations.
This indifference condition is apparent in Figure 6, which decomposes the welfare
function around τ ⋆: the slopes of the steady-state and cyclical terms are equal at the
optimal regulation. The chart also confirms the (local) analytical insight that optimal
regulation is tighter when financial frictions are larger: a rise in φ amplifies cyclical costs
and leaves steady-state costs unchanged, shifting the dotted red line downward and
calling for a higher tax rate to restore the slope equality between the two cost functions.
Figure 7 provides more insights about how optimal regulation responds to stronger
financial frictions in our model. On each chart, the solid blue line indicates the equilib-
rium outcome under the optimal regulation given the value of the friction parameter φ,
whereas the dashed red line corresponds to the outcome observed under the benchmark
parametrization described in Table 1. Hence, comparison between the two lines shed
light on the effects of regulation in our model.
The top-left panel shows the optimal regulation tax τ ⋆ as a function of the friction
φ, keeping all other parameters fixed. The chart confirms the existence of an increasing
relationship: optimal regulation is close to zero when financial frictions are very small (i.e.
when default entails virtually no cyclical cost), and then increases smoothly with φ. The
relationship is also concave, implying that it is optimal to react less than proportionately
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Figure 6. Forces shaping optimal regulation.
τ
0.023 0.043 0.063 τ* = 0.083 0.103 0.123 0.143
Pe
rc
en
t
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Welfare Loss Decomposition
Steady-state term
Cyclical term
Welfare loss
Notes. The figure shows the welfare loss resulting from varying the regulation in-
strument τ around its optimal value τ⋆, with other model parameters fixed at the
values described in Table 1. The dashed and dotted lines provide the decomposition
of welfare into the steady-state and cyclical costs defined in equation (11). Wel-
fare losses are expressed as percent deviations from the central planner benchmark
WCP . Statistics computed on samples with 500, 000 observations.
to increases in financial frictions. This property is explained by the behavior of the
average equilibrium default rate shown in the top-right panel of the figure: average
default is very responsive to the initial tightening in regulation, but then stabilizes slightly
above zero. Since tightening regulation limits cyclical costs by reducing the average size
of default, the gains from additional increases in τ are smaller and smaller.
The remaining two charts in Figure 7 indicate the gains from optimal regulation in
terms of both welfare and cyclical asymmetry. Two results stand out. First, the optimal
policy is able to contain the welfare losses from increasing financial frictions. For instance,
equilibrium welfare is 4% below the central planner benchmark when φ = 4 and the tax
is calibrated as in Table 1, while the loss is well below 1% under optimal regulation.
When φ = 8, the loss is still below 1% when regulation is optimal, compared to 7%
under the baseline policy. Second, the optimal policy limits the equilibrium asymmetry
in capital, and thus also in GDP and consumption.
To better understand the relationship between asymmetry and welfare, Figure 8 plots
the welfare loss as a function of the skewness of log capital for different values of φ, under
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Figure 7. Gains from optimal regulation.
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Notes. The blue lines show the optimal tax, the default rate, the welfare loss, and the skewness
of log capital as functions of the financial friction φ when regulation is set optimally. The
red lines correspond to the case in which regulation is fixed at the level calibrated in Table 1.
Welfare losses are expressed as percent deviations from the central planner benchmark WCP
and the default rate is ∆t/r
d
t−1. Statistics computed on samples with 500, 000 observations.
both the optimal regulation policy (blue line) and the baseline policy (red line). In both
cases, we observe that a rise in asymmetry (more negative skewness) is associated with
greater welfare losses. In addition, for any given level of financial frictions, moving from
the baseline policy to the optimal policy limits asymmetry and improves welfare.
These results indicate that the optimal regulation goes a long way toward limiting the
aggregate effects of default and financial frictions in our model. They also suggest a direct
link between welfare and asymmetry, as limiting welfare losses requires compressing
the left tail of the equilibrium distribution of log capital, GDP, and consumption. In
our framework, this link arises through default, which generates both negative skew in
quantities and cyclical welfare costs.
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Figure 8. Reduced-form relationship between asymmetry and welfare.
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Notes. The blue line show the relationship between the skewness of log capital and the welfare
loss when φ changes under the optimal regulation, while the red line corresponds to the case
in which regulation is fixed at the level calibrated in Table 1. Welfare losses are expressed as
percent deviations from the central planner benchmarkWCP . Statistics computed on samples
with 500, 000 observations.
5. Conclusion
This paper develops a Real Business Cycle model with endogenous default and financial
regulation. We prove analytically that: (i) financial frictions mirror the effect of a
negative shock to capital accumulation; (ii) endogenous default generates asymmetric
business cycles; (iii) tighter regulation decreases steady-state consumption but lowers the
probability of default, which may generate welfare gains. We illustrate these theoretical
results through various quantitative experiments. In particular, we show that the size
of financial frictions amplifies business-cycle asymmetry and that skewed business cycles
are associated with welfare losses.
We see at least four interesting extensions of our stylized framework. First, considering
partial capital depreciation would allow the equilibrium saving rate to vary over time
and potentially depend on the level of financial frictions. Second, and in the same vein,
an endogenous labor supply would highlight interactions between financial frictions and
the labor market, especially during crises. Third, we could take an extended version of
the model with partial depreciation and endogenous labor to the data to check whether
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it is able to reproduce observed asymmetries. Fourth and finally, the variance of produc-
tivity shocks deserves more attention, since volatility affects the decision rule for capital
accumulation through the cost of default.
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Appendix A. Equivalence between Tax and Capital Requirements
In this appendix, we show that regulatory policies implemented through taxes or cap-
ital requirements on financial intermediaries produce equivalent effects. Our argument
largely mirrors that of Bianchi (2011).
Consider a partial-equilibrium version of the model from Section 2.1. Furthermore,
assume that there is no financial friction (φ = 0). The financial intermediary borrows d
and lends k, subject to the balance-sheet constraint k = d. It earns rkk from assets and
pays rdd on liabilities. Default happens when rkk < rdd, that is with probability
Pr[default] = Pr
[
rk
rd
< 1
]
,
where we used the balance-sheet constraint to simplify quantities. Independently of
default, the financial intermediary must pay a tax τrkk proportional to capital income,
where τ > 0 is a tax rate. The free-entry condition for financial intermediation is
therefore
Emax[rkk − rdd, 0] = τrkk,
which can be simplified to
Emax
[
1−
rd
rk
, 0
]
= τ.
It follows immediately that raising the tax rate τ increases the equilibrium lending-
deposit spread rk/rd, which in turn reduces the probability of default Pr[rk/rd < 1].
Now, consider a similar economy in which capital requirements replace taxes: the
financial intermediary must finance at least a fraction γ ∈ [0, 1[ of the loans it issues
with equity e, i.e. e ≥ γk. Assume that raising equity is more costly than raising deposits,
for instance because deposits yield a liquidity service to the household. Other possible
justifications include the outcome of moral-hazard problems or tax disadvantages on
equity (Bianchi, 2011). Since the return on equity is higher than the return on deposits,
the equity constraint is always binding and e = γk. The intermediary’s balance-sheet
becomes k = d+ γk, equivalently (1− γ)k = d. Default still occurs whenever rkk < rdd,
that is with probability
Pr[default] = Pr
[
rk
(1− γ)rd
< 1
]
.
For simplicity, we take the cost of equity to be given by (1 + η)rdγk, with η > 0 being
the additional cost of equity relative to deposits. The free-entry condition in the market
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for intermediation is then
Emax[rkk − rdd, 0] = (1 + η)rdγk,
which can be simplified to
Emax
[
rk
(1− γ)rd
− 1, 0
]
= (1 + η)
γ
1− γ
.
Hence, raising the capital adequacy ratio γ increases the credit spread rk/rd, which ends
up reducing the probability of default Pr[rk/((1− γ)rd) < 1]. It follows that a regulator
could use either of a tax policy or a capital requirement to reduce the probability of
financial default in this model.
Appendix B. Properties of τ
Consider first the case of σ = 0. Then A ≤ 0 implies τ(A, 0) = 0, which we exclude
since we need τ kt > 0. We therefore impose A ∈ ]0,∞[ when σ = 0. Under this constraint,
we have τ(A, 0) = 1− 1/ exp(A), which is increasing in A. Moreover, limA→0 τ(A, 0) = 0
and limA→∞ τ(A, 0) = 1.
In the more general case of σ > 0, we do not need to restrict the support of A, which
belongs to ]−∞,∞[. The derivative of the tax rate with respect to A is
∂τ(A, σ)
∂A
= exp(σ2 − A)Φ
(
A
σ
−
3σ
2
)
> 0.
Using l’Hospital rule to deal with an indeterminate form, we find that limA→−∞ τ(A, σ) =
0. Furthermore, limA→∞ τ(A, σ) = 1 is evident.
Figure 9 provides a graphical illustration of the mapping between τ and A for both
σ > 0 and σ = 0.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 1
We use a guess-and-verify approach. Suppose that the policy function for consumption
verifies
ct = Γǫtk
α
t−1,
where Γ ≥ 0 is an unknown coefficient. Using this guess, equation (6d) and Assumption 1,
the free-entry equation (6e) can be written as
Etmax
[
αǫρtk
α−1
t −
rdt (1 + φ∆t)
exp(ut+1)
, 0
]
= ταǫρtk
α−1
t .
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Figure 9. Mapping between the desired tax rate τ and A given σ.
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Notes. These curves directly result from Assumption 1.
To simplify the notation, define µ1,t = αǫ
ρ
tk
α−1
t and µ2,t = r
d
t (1 + φ∆t). Remark that
both µ1,t and µ2,t are known as of date t, so that the only source of uncertainty is ut+1.
Knowing that u ∼ N(µ, σ2) and using f(·) to denote its pdf., the above equation is
equivalent to ∫
∞
ln
µ2,t
µ1,t
f(u)du−
µ2,t
µ1,t
∫
∞
ln
µ2,t
µ1,t
exp(−u)f(u)du = τ.
After some algebra, this can be expressed as
Φ
(
µ− ln µ2,t
µ1,t
σ
)
−
µ2,t
µ1,t
exp
(
−µ+
σ2
2
)
Φ
(
µ− σ2 − ln µ2,t
µ1,t
σ
)
= τ.
A solution to this equation is
µ1,t = κµ2,t, (12)
where κ > 0 must verify
Φ
(
µ+ lnκ
σ
)
−
1
κ
exp
(
−µ+
σ2
2
)
Φ
(
µ− σ2 + lnκ
σ
)
= τ.
It is impossible to find a closed-form expression κ = κ(µ, σ, τ) in the general case.
However, we can impose Assumption 1 requiring that
τ = Φ
(
A
σ
−
σ
2
)
− Φ
(
A
σ
−
3σ
2
)
exp(σ2 − A),
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with A ∈ ]0,∞[ if σ = 0 and A ∈ ]−∞,∞[ if σ > 0. Then it turns out that
κ = exp
(
−µ−
σ2
2
+ A
)
,
solves the equation.
Plugging κ, µ1,t and µ2,t into equation (12), we obtain
Etr
k
t+1 = exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
)
αǫρtk
α−1
t = exp(A)r
d
t (1 + φ∆t).
We use this relationship between the marginal product of capital and the deposit rate
to simplify equations (6a) and (6c) into
∆t =
αǫρt−1k
α−1
t−1
1 + φ∆t−1
max
[
0, exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
− ut − A
)
− 1
]
,
1
ǫtkαt−1
=
αβ
kt(1 + φ∆t)
Etmin
[
exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
− ut+1 − A
)
, 1
]
. (13)
Define lt = Etmin[exp(µ+ σ
2/2− ut+1 − A), 1]. Then,
lt = Φ
(
σ
2
−
A
σ
)
+ exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
− A
)∫
∞
µ+σ
2
2
−A
exp(−u)f(u)du
= Φ
(
σ
2
−
A
σ
)
+ exp
(
σ2 − A
) [
1− Φ
(
3σ
2
−
A
σ
)]
= 1− τ.
Inserting this expression into the Euler equation (13) yields
kt =
αβ
1 + φ∆t
(1− τ)ǫtk
α
t−1.
Merging this equation with the resource constraint (6b), we obtain
ct = [1− αβ(1− τ)] ǫtk
α
t−1.
This validates our initial guess for the consumption policy function, whose unknown
coefficient verifies
Γ = [1− αβ(1− τ)] .
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Appendix D. Equivalence with Investment Efficiency Shocks and
Capital Quality Shocks
This appendix shows the observational equivalence between our set-up with default
and financial frictions and a model with shocks to the efficiency of investment. We also
demonstrate the correspondence with capital quality shock when capital fully depreciates.
Throughout, we abstract from the tax rate τ without loss of generality.
An influential strand of the literature argues that investment shocks, which affect the
transformation of private savings into productive capital, play a prominent role in US
business cycles (see, among others, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell, 2000; Fisher,
2006; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010, 2011; Moura, 2018). In addition, Jus-
tiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011) show that shocks to investment efficiency proxy
for financial disturbances in DSGE models, an insight that our framework corroborate.
We introduce an investment efficiency shock into the central planner model from Sec-
tion 2.4; see Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) for a very similar set-up.
Household preferences and firm technology remain unchanged, but the aggregate resource
constraint becomes
kt = zt(yt − ct), (14)
where zt ∈ ]0, 1] is the investment shock. If zt = 1 at all periods, we recover the central
planner economy in which savings are fully transformed into productive capital. Here,
we instead assume that, although zt equals 1 at the deterministic steady state, it may
occasionally be below than 1. In that case, a contraction in the efficiency of invest-
ment lowers the amount of productive capital obtained out of savings, with negative
consequences on aggregate production.
The model has a simple solution. At each period, the consumption-saving plan is
characterized by the Euler equation
1
ztct
= αβEt
yt+1
ktct+1
.
Using the aggregate resource constraint, this is also
yt
ct
= 1 + αβEt
yt+1
ct+1
.
Since αβ < 1, substituting forward and imposing the transversality condition yields
ct = (1− αβ)yt, (15)
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so that the equilibrium saving rate does not depend on the investment shock zt. This is
not the case of capital accumulation, which is given by
kt = ztαβǫtk
α
t−1. (16)
It is immediate that equations (15) and (16) are equivalent to equations (7a) and (7b)
from Proposition 1 when
zt =
1
1 + φ∆t
∈ ]0, 1].
It follows that our model with default and financial frictions provides a micro-foundation
for investment efficiency shocks. More precisely, a negative investment shock in the above
model is observationally equivalent to the negative externality arising from endogenous
default in Model (DEF ).
Several papers mimic the aggregate effects of financial crisis using disturbances to
capital quality (see for instance Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Quer-
alto, 2012, and many others). To model these shocks, we slightly modify the central
planner economy from Section 2.4 to introduce incomplete capital depreciation at rate
δ ∈]0, 1] and a capital quality shock ψt ∈]0, 1]. Define in-process capital st as the sum of
after-depreciation productive capital (1− δ)kt−1 and investment it:
st = (1− δ)kt−1 + it,
and assume that in-process capital is transformed into next-period productive capital
after the realization of a multiplicative capital quality shock:
kt = ψtst.
Merging these equations, the aggregate resource constraint becomes
yt = ct + it = ct + st − (1− δ)kt−1 = ct +
kt
ψt
− (1− δ)kt−1.
In the special case of δ = 1, this simplifies into
kt = ψt(yt − ct),
which is equivalent to the resource constraint (14) from the model with investment
efficiency shocks. It follows that the model solution is given by equations (15) and (16),
in which the capital quality shock ψt simply replaces the investment efficiency shock
zt. Hence, in an economy with full capital depreciation a capital quality shock is also
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observationally equivalent to the negative externality arising from endogenous default in
Model (DEF ).
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 3
Define
g(τ) = (1− α) ln
[
1− αβ
1− αβ(1− τ)
]
− α ln(1− τ),
with τ ∈ ]0, 1[ according to Assumption 1. Since limτ→0 g(τ) = 0, limτ→1 g(τ) =∞, and
∂g(τ)/∂τ > 0, we have g(τ) > 0. Moreover, ∆t ≥ 0 by definition, so that φ ≥ 0 implies
E ln(1 + φ∆t) ≥ 0. Together, these restrictions prove the first part of the proposition.
When σ = 0, ∆t = 0 from equation (7c) andWDEF →WCP when τ → 0. This proves
the second part of the proposition.
When φ = 0, ln(1 + φ∆t) = 0 and WDEF → WCP when τ → 0. This proves the last
part of the proposition.
Appendix F. Welfare Approximation
This appendix proves the welfare approximations from Section 4.1.
Replacing ǫt by its expression (7d) in equation (7c) gives
∆t(1 + φ∆t−1) = αǫ
ρ
t−1k
α−1
t−1 max
[
exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
− A
)
− exp(ut), 0
]
.
Under simplification (A2) from Assumption 2, taking the unconditional expectation of
both sides of the equality and applying the Law of Iterated Expectations gives
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The conditional expectation is∫ µ+σ2/2−A
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It easy to show that limA→−∞ h(σ,A) = ∞ and limA→∞ h(σ,A) = 0. Moreover, the
partial derivative verifies
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Together with the limits as A → ±∞, this implies h(σ,A) > 0. Overall, the expected
value of the default term is thus
E∆t = α exp
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2
)
h(σ,A)E
(
ǫρt−1k
α−1
t−1
)
. (17)
To obtain an analytical expression for the last term, we use simplification (A3) from
Assumption 2 and take a log-linear approximation around the non-stochastic steady state
of the model. This gives
E
(
ǫρt−1k
α−1
t−1
)
≈ ǫ¯ρk¯α−1E
[
1 + ρ (ln ǫt−1 − ln ǫ¯) + (α− 1)
(
ln kt−1 − ln k¯
)]
,
where upper bars denote non-stochastic steady-state levels. From equations (7b) and (7d),
we obtain
ǫ¯ = exp(µ)
1
1−ρ ,
k¯ = [αβ(1− τ)ǫ¯]
1
1−α ,
E ln ǫt =
µ
1− ρ
,
(1− α)E ln kt = ln[αβ(1− τ)] +
µ
1− ρ
− E ln(1 + φ∆t).
Finally, simplification (A1) from Assumption 2 allows to write the last equation as
(1− α)E ln kt ≈ ln[αβ(1− τ)] +
µ
1− ρ
− φE∆t.
It follows that
E
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αβ(1− τ) exp(µ)
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Consolidating equations (18) and (17) then yields
E∆t =
θ
1− φθ
, with θ = exp
(
σ2
2
)
h(σ,A)
β(1− τ)
.
It is clear that h(σ,A) > 0 implies θ > 0. Equation (A4) from Assumption 2 then implies
that E∆t > 0, which is consistent with default having a non-negative support.
Finally, these computations yield an analytical expression for the last term in welfare
WDEF : relying once more on simplification (A1) from Assumption 2, we have
E ln(1 + φ∆t) ≈ φE∆t =
φθ
1− φθ
≥ 0.
Figure 10 shows that the approximation error resulting from Assumption 2 is small
for a wide range of parameter. We have also verified that (A4) holds for all parameter
configurations used in this figure.
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Figure 10. Approximation error due to Assumption 2.
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Notes. The figure shows the approximation error in welfare computations induced
by Assumption 2. It reports, for different (φ, σ) combinations, the absolute value
of the ratio (W˜DEF −WDEF )/WDEF , where W˜DEF is the analytical welfare ap-
proximation andWDEF is the exact model welfare. Statistics computed on samples
with 500, 000 observations. τ is kept constant at the value reported in Table1 in all
simulations.
Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 4
The sign of the first partial derivative is immediate since ∂E ln(1+φ∆t)/∂φ = θ/(1−
φθ)2 > 0.
To prove the sign of the second partial derivative, we know from Appendix B that
∂τ/∂A > 0. Therefore, it is equivalent to prove ∂E ln(1 + φ∆t)/∂τ < 0 or ∂E ln(1 +
φ∆t)/∂A < 0. Using the properties of τ and h(σ,A) derived in Appendices B and F, we
obtain
∂θ
∂A
= − exp
(
σ2
2
)
(1− τ)Φ (−σ/2− A/σ) + h(A, σ)Φ (σ/2− A/σ)
β(1− τ)2
< 0,
which implies in turn
∂E ln(1 + φ∆t)
∂A
=
∂θ/∂A
(1− φθ)2
< 0.
This proves the second result.
Finally, it is equivalent to prove the sign of the last partial derivative with respect to
τ or A:
sign
(
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)
= sign
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)
.
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Then, the above results as well as (A4) in Assumption 2 imply
∂2E ln(1 + φ∆t)
∂A∂φ
=
∂
∂A
[
θ
(1− φθ)2
]
=
(1− φθ)(1 + φθ)
(1− φθ)4
∂θ
∂A
< 0.
Since all partial derivatives are themselves differentiable, Schwarz’s theorem (see, e.g.,
Rudin, 1976, for details) implies
∂2E ln(1 + φ∆t)
∂φ∂τ
< 0.
